In the years which followed Japan's surrender East Asia was transformed by political and diplomatic revolutions which erased the sympathies and suspicions of half a century. In China civil war produced a regime which abandoned friendship with the United States. In Japan, defeat and occupation welded an alliance with America which ·has survived continuous opposition.
The domestic significance of these complex changes is universally recognized. Their importance in Soviet-American rivalry is rarely neglected, but the history of Sino-Japanese relations is a largely 1) forgotten aspect of the occupation years. Much documentation necessary for the study of this question is not yet accessible, yet sufficient material is available to illuminate some major themes of Kuomintang policy towards defeated Japan. In particular the Minutes of the Allied Council for Japan, the most public international forum for the discussion of occupation policy reveal many of 2) the chief priorities of Chinese diplomacy.
Before discussing policies within the Allied Council it is necessary to outline the evolution of occupation administration. as this provided the essential framework for Allied rivalries during six and a half years of military control.
It is common knowledge that American power overwhelmed Japan in the summer of 1945, but the political consequences of her enormous power were as important as her military victories. American military success was the product of enormous wealth which supported ~t~27(2'188)358 3) lavish intellectual preparation for the comtng peace. Furthermore the distance of the United States from the turmoil of battle permitted reflective planning which was impossible in more war torn states.
In short, America was prepared for the occupation of Japan while her allies were not. On arrival in Tokyo Supreme Commander MacArthur possessed detailed plans which enabled his staff to begin 4) major acts of punishment, surgery, and reform. Consequently American troops not only. occupied Japan in the first months of peace but they established a control structure which issued instructions to the Japanese Government with formidable speed. By the close of 1945 the press had been freed, political prisoners released, trade unions encouraged, and a purge of wartime leaders begun.
Indeed, within the first four months of American rule the broad lines of policy had been determined, and two groups of Japanese 5) leaders pressed into a study of constitutional reform. on a compromise formula for the control of Japan. The Advisory Commission was re-named the Far Eastern Commission. This was to consist of the eleven states which had defeated Japan, and would 12) meet in the old Japanese Embassy Building in Washington. Its role was to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the 13) Terms of Surrender may be accomplished". Clearly the distance which separated the Commission from its area of concern, and a procedure with a virtual great power veto, limited its effectiveness to a minimum. Its subsequent activities were largely confined to approving policies long after their execution. The second body which emerged from the Moscow Conference was the Allied Council 14) for Japan. This four power agency consisted of the United States, 15) China, the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union, and existed "for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme ~t~27(2'186) 356 Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supple- 16) mentary thereto". MacArthur was to "consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting". If a member of the Council disagreed with the Supreme Commander on a fundamental matter the Agreement specified that the Supreme Commander would "withhold the issuance of orders .... ··pending agreement in the Far Eastern Commission". Certainly the Council's brief was somewhat unclear, but the representatives despatched from Moscow, Canberra, and Nanking were surely not unreasonable in believing that the Council was intended to perform a useful function, if not a dominant 17) one.
The First Meeting of the Council on 5th April 1946 certainly had the trappings of importance. The Supreme Commander himself attended the morning gathering at the Meiji Seimei Building. The press was well represented, and the occasion occupied the headlines 18) in the following day's newspapers. In contrast MacArthur regarded the Council with deep suspicion and his opening address may well have surprised Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, W. MacMahon Ball, and Lieutenant General Derevyanko. After an eloquent appeal for international co-operation the Supreme Commander emphasised the "advisory and consultative" character of the Council, and stressed 19) that it would not divide his "executive authority". He underlined the importance of press publicity to avoid the "suspicion···distrust 20) and···hatred so often engendered by the veil of secrecy", and declared "there is nothing···to conceal···from the eyes and ears of our fallen adversary" . body. With the support of the Soviet and Commonwealth delegates he suggested the creation of four specialist sub-committees covering politics, economic affairs, education and culture, and military prob- 29) lems. These groups would examine SCAP proposals, and pool specialist advice so that informed suggestions could be passed to the Supreme Commander. In particular, the Chinese representative hoped that these expert committees would be able to make field investigations of regions or problems, and be free to carryon dis- cipate". From this it was clear that any attempt to co-ordinate independent research would provoke determined opposition from Occupation Headquarters.
At the same meeting the United States Representative cum Chairman revealed his power to obstruct discussion in a new and simple way. The United States was already supplying foodstuffs to Japan to relieve a desperate shortage. For political and humanitarian reasons she sought to minimise malnutrition and avoid starvation.
In the aftermath of war when many countries were suffering from acute scarcities it was natural that MacMahon Ball sought to discuss "food for Japan" as "part of a world problem". He wondered whether the needs of Japan were "greater than the needs of. .. occupied or 33) liberated countries, in other parts of the world". But in response
Atcheson made no attempt to justify or analyse American policy.
~t~27(2'182)352
He ruled that the issue was "entirely outside" the scope of the
~4)
Council's activities.
At the Fourth Meeting of the Council the three again confronted the Chairman on the question of information. General Derevyanko asked that all decrees be sent to the Council well before they were issued, so that they could be studied in detail. Yet once more the representatives found themselves caught in a vicious circle of American evasiveness. General Chu acknowledged that against a background of full information and study forty-eight hours would suffice 35) to examine decrees. But the first months of the Council's activities had shown that receiving the desired information at the appropriate time could hardly be taken for granted. By early June the atmosphere within the Council had calmed, and there was less bitterness than in earlier months. Despite this improvement the Chairman was still prone to ruffle and tease the delegates by presenting intensely complex issues and requesting immediate advice. In June he asked for plans to rehabilitate ex-officers but 38) provided rio statistical information. A month later he urged the delegates to suggest schemes for maritime quarantine, but none of 39) them had scientific advisers who could provide essential data.
Such action merely unified the dissident three, and this unity and 68% of those in British hands had also landed at ports in Japan .
• 0)
Less than 1% of prisoners in Soviet hands had been similarly released.
In these discussions the Chairman thanked the Chinese for their sterling co-operation. General Chu emphasised that there had not been "a single major unpleasant incident" during repatriation, and believed that most ex-prisoners were "fully saturated with a deep surprised their colleagues. This expertise stemmed from a common script, education in Japanese universities, and a prolonged war in 45) which knowledge of Japan was vital for China's survival. concern for the revival of the Japanese economy which conflicted strongly with much of Chinese public opinion. After hearing the 48) Chief of the Industry Section explain that the loss of Korean labour and food shortages had reduced productivity in Japanese mines to half its wartime level, General Chu, for the first time discussed the 49) interdependence of the Chinese and Japanese economies. He emphasised Japan's traditional need for coking coal for her steel industry, and the production difficulties of Chinese mines producing fuel coal.
In view of this situation he suggested an emergency barter trade whereby China would supply Japan with coking coal in return for
Miike coal for China. He also recommended the nationalization of some Japanese mines, an improvement in working conditions, and 60) labour participation in management.
On 18th September the Chinese delegate reported that his barter plan had been enthusiastically received in Japanese business circles. Corporation had shown that efficient results could be achieved by 52) state enterprises. Where mines were too large, and therefore too expensive, to be bought by the state it suggested partial state investment and management. In other cases there could be private ownership and government management, while a sliding scale of subsidies and incentives could be used to stimulate efficiency. He outlined three principles as the basis of the Chinese recommendations.
Firstly the state owned and administered mines should be operated on purely commercial basis as "industry should be independent of 5~)
politics just as the church should be separated from the state". Next mines should be equipped with new machinery ; and finally, management should be democratized as far as possible, so raising miners/-morale and efficiency. The aim of these changes was similarly three fold. Production would be raised, inflation stemmed, and the power of the zaibatsu and other monoplistic organizations weakened. The
Occupation authorities and the Japanese Government never accepted these well considered proposals but they vividly illustrate a chief 54) priority of Chinese policy.
In blockade of Japan".
In the spring of 1947 the concern of the Chinese representative for recovery and stability was further apparent in a new discussion of repatriated Japanese. On this occasion General Chu openly referred to the poor reputation which the Council enjoyed among 57) journalists. To remedy this he suggested that his colleagues concentrate upon moderate, constructive discussions. Regarding the plight of repatriates he called for "an all round welfare programme, long term as well as short term" to be "systematically worked out", and output; and a thorough going suppression of the black market. All these suggestions closely reflected contemporary tendencies in SCAP 61) thinking.
Although Nationalist Chinese policy moved closer and closer to SCAP directives it was far removed from much public opinion on the mainland.
In early 1947 the Occupation authorities invited a party of ten well-known Chinese journalists to make a comprehensive tour of Japan to study recent tendencies. They visited Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, and other major centres, and held discussions with Commonwealth Member. Within the same week George Atcheson 67) died in an air accident. With the disappearance of these two powti't;27(2'174)344
erful figures the vitality of the Council was even further impaired.
In China civil war was threatening the basis of Nationalist power and her spokesman became less and less likely to dissent from the 68) policies of her key ally, the United States.
On 1st October the new Chinese Representative General Shang once more returned to the theme of economic recovery and regretted that "since the Sino-Japanese hostilities mines, industrial equipment, transportation etc. throughout China have been severely damaged"
and therefore China could not supply Japan with sufficient raw material to meet her requirements. Perhaps of even greater interest was his suggestion that Japan, despite her many crises, might "find her way to render assistance to China in the industrial field" so that 69) she might export more raw materials to Japan.
Throughout 1948 the Council fell into a state of prolonged torpor.
On 28th April "the three" protested that the Maritime Safety Board 70) had been created without any prior notice. There was a flash of temporary unity but neither the new Commonwealth member, Patrick Shaw, nor his Chinese colleague objected to the contents of the new measure.
B'etween May and August the Council's Agenda was empty and the representatives' attended pro forma meetings lasting one or two 71) minutes. On 28th August the Council discussed SCAP inspired action to remove the right to strike of public employees. The Soviet delegate made predictable criticisms. Shaw gave reluctant support.
While the Chinese delegate, abandoned earlier ideas of democratic 72) management, and approved the Japanese Government's action. By now his government was a struggling satellite. Government policy towards the course of Occupation policy was a major source of widespread dissatisfaction. Once more the complaint was being raised that Chinese raw materials were fuelling Japanese industry and Japanese goods were said to be re-entering the Chinese 74) market.
In addition to the broad thread of American policy small but emotionally inflammable incidents further ignited opinion. In the summer of 1946 Tokyo police had fired on Formosans. Chinese stores and homes had been searched, and old prejudices were alleged 75) to be rife. All such news provoked further hostility in Chinese implied that Japan's economic recovery would assist China, and stated "as a hungry and restless people (Japan) will be a threat to peace. Such a situation is made to order for Communism. If we are sincere in our profession that Communism in the general interest must be stopped then we must remove the causes which 76) encourage Communism". Stuart was too sophisticated an Ambassador to express all his sentiments directly. He hinted at a reduction in American aid if the "Anti-American-Aid-to-Japan" movement continued, but this was a message to be inferred, rather than clearly understood from his remarks.
In January 1949 the Allied Council once more held a meeting 77) which centred upon serious debate. In a discussion of the increasing size of Japanese police forces, the Chinese delegate made a firm ~ti1;27(2·172)342 statement in favour of a force sufficient for law and order to be fully 18) preserved. He condemned any notion of Japanese rearmament but in no way reflected the hostility to American policy which was prevalent on the mainland.
From January to December 1949 the Council delegates assembled 79) twenty four times and found nothing to discuss. The Council was almost dead, but in an ever harsher atmosphere of Cold War it had a brief but spiritless role to play. Throughout Japan there was widespread anxiety at the fate of over 300,000 prisoners still in Soviet hands. Many citizens addressed letters and petitions to the Occupation authorities and Council members.
Finally in December Chairman Sebald placed the problem on the
80)
Agenda.
enterprise.
Propaganda and humanitarianism were sourly mixed in this that Kislenko "had spent the past months···digging into the···number, whereabouts and conditions of the 370,000 Japanese prisoners"'still under detention by the Soviet Government" and stated that "the Council and the Japanese people would be most anxious to hear the 84) answer". In later comments he referred to the "pernicious germs of only two brief discussions. Its' final meeting was held five days before the restoration of Japanese independence. Kislenko used the occasion to denounce the "illegality" of the San Francisco Treaty, and measures against left wing publications. The Chinese delegate 87) had no instructions, and therefore no views on the Council's demise.
No one would claim that the Allied Council for Japan was a major 14) It is significant that the word "Control" does not appear in the name of the Council, or the Commission.
15) "a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India". Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December
